Issues with Anjouan-Licensed Casinos – Lack of Oversight and Accountability? (page 2)

Hello, I just want to add that the implementation of LOK, as well as the recent (September) collapse of the Curaçao administrative board, practically means that casinos need to find alternatives. Therefore, the AOFA stands out significantly, although its quality is comparable to that of the entire Curacao system at this time. Same nada.

I'd say, under such circumstances, and since players can see the casino license, I believe they can decide whether it is worth the risk you mentioned or not. Since there are no working alternatives anymore, how could possibly "awarding" zero ratings to casinos just because they are licensed potentially help players? Well, based on our research and data studies, players want to play.

But you are right, it would be cool to have one steady and capable offshore license for all those players who for some reason do not seek casinos licensed in their countries or come from weak or unregulated markets. That's a fantastic point.

Hi, thanks for the explanation — could you clarify something for me?

I understand the general point you’re making, but I’m still a bit confused and want to make sure I’m reading this correctly. Are you saying that:

Curaçao’s old system more or less collapsed in September,

LOK isn’t fully operational yet,

and therefore casinos are moving to AOFA/Anjouan even though it offers roughly the same (very limited) level of protection?

I just want to be sure I understand what this means for players in practical terms. Could you explain that part a little more?

Thanks again.

Hello,

Simply put: yes—it has.

I did a brief recap with (ChatGPT) of the events; I hope it helps here:

In late 2025, Curaçao’s long-promised gambling reform (LOK – Landsverordening op de Kansspelen) hit a major bump.

The entire Supervisory Board of the Curaçao Gaming Authority (CGA) resigned in mid-September, leaving the regulator without its top oversight body at the very moment it was supposed to transition to a more transparent and structured regulatory model.

LOK was introduced to replace the old master-licence system, however...

The resignation of the entire Supervisory Board created an obvious governance vacuum.

CGA continued operating — issuing licences, handling compliance, communicating with the public — but without the board that was supposed to oversee and validate its decisions.

At the same time:

responsibility for gambling oversight was shifted from the Ministry of Finance to the Ministry of Justice,

communication from the government was inconsistent, and reform deadlines kept slipping.

The result?

A regulator technically functional, but visibly unstable.

Where AOFA comes in?

While CGA was trying to navigate internal turbulence, AOFA (the Autonomous Online Gaming Association) capitalised on the situation.

Operators and players naturally gravitated towards anyone who seemed more stable, more communicative, and at least somewhat predictable — even if the actual quality of oversight was not significantly different.

AOFA quickly gained relevance because:

CGA looked shaky after the September resignations,

LOK implementation was slower than expected,

and stakeholders were desperate for a sense of order.

The bottom line:

LOK is still a necessary reform, but the execution has been messy.

CGA remains operational, but the loss of its supervisory board undermined confidence.

AOFA grew fast, mostly because it filled the perception gap, not because it is inherently better.

Right now, Curaçao’s landscape is a mix of "work in progress," shifting responsibilities, and organisations trying to prove they can offer structure where the official system still wobbles.

From the player's perspective:

1. Curaçao does not operate a real ADR system

There is no official, structured, or enforceable mechanism for resolving disputes between players and operators.

No mandatory deadlines, no transparent procedures, no published decisions.

It simply doesn’t exist.

2. "Contact the regulator" sounds good, but in practice…

Most of the time, it means:

"We received your message. Beyond that, there isn’t much we can do."

CGA may:

acknowledge the complaint,

forward you back to the operator, or

not respond at all.

It’s not malice — they simply lack the mandate, capacity, and tools to deal with individual disputes, especially with sub-licensed operators.

3. The whole system was built to leave disputes to the casino

Historically, the Curaçao framework was designed so that the relationship between the player and the casino remained strictly private.

The regulator stayed hands-off,

and no alternative dispute resolution was required.

4. The resignation of the entire Supervisory Board made it even weaker

The system was already fragile.

After the September resignations, there is even less oversight and even less authority to intervene in complaint cases.

5. The hard truth

Curaçao is not an effective route for resolving disputes or enforcing payouts. Not now, not historically.

An article from SiGMA: https://sigma.world/news/curacao-pm-control-gaming-body-board-en-masse/