Stasya Yautodzyeva: "Collecting fines from offshore gambling operators is harder than headline figures may suggest"

In this interview, Stasya Yautodzyeva discusses the large fines issued against offshore gambling operators in the Netherlands and beyond, and explores whether current regulatory mechanisms are sufficient to enforce them in an increasingly globalized market.

Q: Recently, the KSA caught news headlines by announcing a record-setting penalty against an unlicensed (in the country) operator. As we understand, there is an ongoing issue with the regulator's ability to exact payments from fined companies - is that true?

It is true that collecting fines from offshore gambling operators is much harder in practice than headline figures may suggest. The Netherlands itself provides a good real-world example of this problem.

In May 2021, the Dutch regulator KSA imposed a €440,000 fine on Raging Rhino N.V. (LuckyDays) for offering online gambling to Dutch players without a license. The regulator later explicitly confirmed that the company paid the fine. This detail matters because the KSA has a clear practice of publicly indicating when a fine has actually been paid – given that this practice exists, the absence of similar confirmations in other cases strongly suggests that most fines are simply never paid. Over the past few years, the KSA has issued dozens of penalties against offshore operators, yet there are no additional publicly confirmed cases of payment.

These unpaid fines range from relatively smaller amounts – such as Virtual Coin Gaming N.V. (€500,000 + €100,000) and Trustfulgames.com Limited (€170,000) – to very large sanctions like N1 Interactive Limited (€12.64m), Videoslots Limited (€9.874m) and GoldWin Limited (€6.794m). In several cases, the regulator has even publicly confirmed non-payment.

The most recent case illustrates the problem even more clearly. A Curaçao-based company, Novatech Solutions N.V., was fined €25 million by the KSA – the largest fine the regulator has ever issued. However, on the very same day the company was dissolved and its registration in the corporate registry was discontinued.

In practice, this rarely means the activity actually disappears. In many cases, the same operation simply re-emerges under a different corporate structure, with a new company name and more carefully concealed shareholders or directors. Another common scenario is relocation to a different offshore jurisdiction. Operator probably chose to move because they believe that a large regulatory fine could eventually attract attention from Curacao.

This reflects a broader global pattern. Reaching offshore operators is extremely difficult. Even courts often struggle to enforce penalties across jurisdictions – let alone regulators acting on their own. Europe has seen well-known examples of this problem, including Malta’s regulatory "shield" and long-running legal disputes involving Germany and Austria.

Q: Is there a mechanism in place that could strengthen the regulator's collection powers and lead to payments?

In theory, the only mechanism that could significantly improve enforcement is cross-border regulatory cooperation and a willingness of offshore jurisdictions to assist foreign regulators. As of now, however, this mechanism remains extremely limited, since offshore jurisdictions rarely side with foreign regulators. One of the few recent examples comes from Curaçao, where in November 2024 a local court declared BlockDance B.V. and Small House B.V. bankrupt following claims related to roughly $2 million in unpaid player balances. Though even in this case the proceedings relate to claims from players rather than enforcement actions initiated by a foreign regulator.

So, today there is still no consistently functioning mechanism for recovering fines or damages from offshore operators. Their jurisdictions of incorporation often ignore claims from foreign regulators or actively protect their local operators. Meanwhile, offshore platforms rarely leave regulated markets entirely even after enforcement – instead they typically continue operating by switching domains or mirror sites.

Q: Is it correct to conclude, then, that many of these headline-grabbing enforcement actions are more PR than they are practical, or is the allocation of proportionate penalties an essential part of the enforcement process?

To some extent, such enforcement actions inevitably have a signaling element, but that does not make them meaningless. Public fines serve several important regulatory functions even when the probability of immediate collection is limited.

First, they demonstrate that the regulator is actively monitoring the market and responding to violations. Even if large offshore operators may not be deterred immediately, this visibility can discourage smaller or less experienced companies from entering the market illegally. It reinforces the message that unlicensed activity is detected and formally sanctioned.

Second, these actions create both local and international precedent. When a particular offshore operator accumulates regulatory penalties across multiple jurisdictions, the overall risk profile of that operator increases significantly. This can affect their relationships with partners such as payment providers, software suppliers and affiliates. It may also influence the stance of the jurisdiction where the operator is licensed, particularly if repeated enforcement actions create reputational or compliance concerns that could affect license renewal.

In practice, this does not directly stop offshore activity, but it increases the operational friction associated with it. Offshore operators may find it harder to secure payment processing, platform partnerships or marketing channels if they are consistently associated with regulatory violations.

Finally, regulators cannot realistically avoid issuing such penalties. If authorities refrained from enforcing licensing requirements simply because cross-border collection is difficult, the market would effectively appear open to unlicensed operators. Enforcement actions therefore remain a necessary part of maintaining the credibility of the regulatory framework, even when their practical impact is sometimes limited.

Q: Speaking of mechanisms that would allow collections, do you foresee such a mechanism emerging?

There are early signs that such mechanisms may gradually emerge as part of broader structural changes in the global gambling market.

One important factor is the transformation of traditionally offshore jurisdictions. Curaçao is a clear example. Historically known for a permissive licensing system with limited oversight, the jurisdiction has recently introduced significant reforms, including stronger AML requirements, compliance reporting, responsible gambling rules and more structured supervision of licensees. In many respects, its framework is moving closer to European regulatory standards.

These reforms reflect a wider global trend toward legalization. Between 2000 and 2010, around 28 jurisdictions introduced regulated gambling frameworks; between 2010 and 2020, another 47 followed; and in just the last five years about 35 additional markets have implemented regulatory systems. As more countries introduce local licensing regimes, operating without a license becomes increasingly difficult.

Market infrastructure is already responding to this shift. Payment providers, software platforms and other partners increasingly prefer to work with operators that can demonstrate credible regulatory oversight. In practice, this often means that locally licensed operators are seen as more reliable partners, especially when offshore licenses are perceived as weak or insufficiently supervised. This dynamic is one of the reasons why several offshore jurisdictions themselves are raising regulatory standards, strengthening transparency and compliance requirements to keep their licenses acceptable to global partners.

At the same time, the legal landscape is evolving. European courts are already issuing decisions that involve offshore operators and gradually establishing legal precedents. Over time, these precedents can become the basis for broader cross-border enforcement mechanisms. As cooperation between regulators increases, operators may begin to face pressure not only from the markets where they actively operate, but also from jurisdictions that previously had little visibility of their activities.

Eventually, this cumulative pressure is likely to reach the offshore jurisdictions that issue licenses to these operators. In order to avoid turning regulatory disputes into wider political or financial conflicts, those jurisdictions may increasingly be incentivized to cooperate with international enforcement efforts.

This process will not be simple or fast. However, as legalization continues to expand globally and legal precedents accumulate, the foundations for more effective cross-border enforcement are likely to develop gradually over time.

Q: Beyond the Netherlands, has there been a jurisdiction to successfully impose such cross-border fines?

Confirmed examples of regulators successfully collecting cross-border fines from offshore operators are extremely rare. In practice, they are difficult to identify because hundreds of sanctions may be issued while only a handful are ever confirmed as paid.

One notable example comes from the United States during the 2011 "Black Friday" enforcement action against offshore poker platforms. Federal prosecutors brought criminal cases against PokerStars, Full Tilt Poker and Absolute Poker for illegal gambling, bank fraud and money laundering. After domain seizures and a lengthy legal process, the U.S. Department of Justice reached a 2012 settlement under which PokerStars forfeited about $547 million to the government and made roughly $184 million available to repay players, for a combined outcome of around $731 million. However, this case differs from typical regulatory enforcement: it was the result of criminal proceedings and asset forfeiture rather than a regulatory fine.

A more recent example comes from India in connection with the offshore betting platform 1xBet. Authorities pursued the case through anti–money laundering investigations and seized assets linked to the operator’s promotional network, including properties associated with sports marketing arrangements involving cricket players. Again, the recovery came through local asset seizure rather than the collection of a regulatory fine from the offshore operator.

For this reason, comparable modern examples, particularly in Europe, are extremely difficult to trace. Regulators frequently announce large fines against offshore operators, but confirmed payments are rarely documented. In practice, operators often withdraw from the market, reappear under new domains or brands, or simply ignore the sanctions if they have no assets in the jurisdiction. As a result, successful cross-border recovery of such fines remains exceptional rather than routine.

Image credit: Casino Guru News